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ABSTRACT: Most arguments can be presented in different forms, e.g. with explicit data or with an 
explicit inference license and, in the latter case, with a modus ponens- or a modus tollens-inference 
license. It is arguable that one form is more appropriate or effective with regard to a specific piece of 
argumentation than another. However, in this paper it is argued that with regard to analogical reductio 
ad absurdum argumentation, its alleged persuasive effect is due to a successful appeal to common 
ground and not to its form.  
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A study of the literature on reductio ad absurdum argumentation yields numerous 
examples of analogical argumentation (McBurney & Mills 1964; Thompson 1971; 
Hollihan & Baaske 1973; Freeley 1981; Jensen 1981; Tindale & Gough 1987). In 
those examples the listener is forced to reject a certain standpoint, for failure to do so, 
it is suggested, would entail a commitment to another, comparable standpoint which 
was patently absurd. The commitment to the absurd position, it is suggested, is 
implied in the assertion of the viewpoint under attack. The comparable standpoint is 
supposed to be absurd because it contradicts either generally agreed opinions or well-
known facts. In the following argument the assertion that one should always reject the 
death penalty is attacked on the basis of this kind of reasoning: 
 
There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore not even in the case of 
Saddam Hussein, for if you reject the death penalty on principle in all cases, you also have to 
do that with retrospective force in respect of the death sentences pronounced and carried out 
after the Second World War in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe. (Letter to the NRC 
Handelsblad, November 9, 2006)  
 
In this argument the absurd implication consists of an analogical situation that—
according to the arguer—would be endorsed by any person who subscribes to the 
standpoint that one should never reject death penalty. The implicit premise of the 
argument can be supposed to be something like: no one wishes with retrospective 
effect to revoke death penalties sentenced and carried out in the Netherlands and in 
other European countries after World War II. In other words: that is an absurd idea. 
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 Authors who discuss the reductio ad absurdum on the basis of examples of 
analogical argumentation consider this kind of argumentation a very effective 
rhetorical strategy because of its supposed irony and use of ridicule or humour 
(McBurney & Mills 1964, p. 288, Jensen 1981, p. 189, Tindale & Gough 1987, p. 13 
ff.). It is also commended for its simplicity and directness (Freeley 1981, p. 23). 
Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca suggest that this effect is due to the typical form of 
reductio ad absurdum. Characteristic of the reductio ad absurdum form is the appeal 
to the consequences which are alleged to be logically implied by the viewpoint under 
attack—formulated as a conditional statement. Judging from Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca, an appeal to consequences is an important means of making something appear 
ridiculous:  
 
(…) so [ridicule attaches to] anyone who sets forth principles whose unforeseen consequences 
put him in opposition to ideas which are accepted in a given society, and which he himself 
would not dare to contravene. (1969, p. 206) 
 
In this respect they explicitly refer to the reductio ad absurdum as a strong means of 
achieving this end; they even identify this as one of the strongest objections to be 
made in argumentation (p. 207).   
These remarks are interesting in the light of my research on argument forms, 
because they suggest that from a rhetorical point of view analogical argumentation 
presented in the reductio ad absurdum form has advantages over other forms. For 
example, another form in which argumentation can be presented is the form with a 
direct appeal to the comparable case instead of presenting this case as an implication 
of the attacked viewpoint. The example about the death penalty of Saddam Hussein 
can also be presented in such a form: 
 
There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore not even in the case of 
Saddam Hussein, for you also don’t do that with retrospective force in respect of the death 
sentences pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the Netherlands and 
elsewhere in Europe. 
 
However, elsewhere (Jansen 2006) I argued that with regard to analogical 
argumentation both the argument form of reductio ad absurdum and the form in 
which a direct appeal is made to the comparable case are probably equally persuasive. 
In this lecture I will elaborate on this conclusion and add some further considerations. 
I will do so by exploring what makes an analogical reductio ad absurdum a 
persuasive argument and discuss whether this is better expressed in one form rather 
than the other. In order to contextualise the research, the paper starts with a discussion 
of the notion of argument form and some forms that can be distinguished. 
 
2. ARGUMENT FORM 
 
I use ‘argument form’ as a notion that concerns the reconstruction that can be made of 
the presentation of single argumentation. Apart from the specific formulations that 
can be used for the standpoint and the premises, a single argument can be presented 
with either explicit data or an explicit inference license, and with an inference license 
containing either a modus ponens or modus tollens presentation with regard to the 
order of content of antecedent and consequent and the distribution of negations.1 
Examples of these different presentations are: ‘She’s probably not at home, since her 
                                                 
1 I am not sure yet whether this overview is exhaustive. See also footnote 3. 
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car is not outside’ (explicit data), ‘She’s probably not at home, for if her car is not 
outside, she most likely isn’t’ (explicit inference license, modus ponens), and ‘She’s 
probably not at home, otherwise [if she were at home] her car would be outside’ 
(explicit inference license, modus tollens). These forms require the following 
reconstructions in pragma-dialectical terminology (1 being the standpoint, 1.1 the 
explicit premise and 1.1’ the unexpressed premise; see van Eemeren & Grootendorst 
1992): 
 
1  Y, because   Suzanne is probably not at home, because 
1.1 X, and    her car is not outside, and 
1.1’  if X, then Y   (implicit: if her car is not outside, then she’s  
probably not at home) 
 
1  Y, because   Suzanne is probably not at home, because 
1.1 if X, then Y, and  if her car is not outside, she most likely isn’t, and 
1.1’ X is the case   (implicit: her car is not outside) 
 
1  Y, because   Suzanne is probably not at home, because 
1.1 if not-Y, then not-X  if she were at home, her car would be outside and 
1.1’ not not-X (not-X is not true) her car is not outside 
 
Very often the same argument can be presented in any of these forms. In all three 
forms, the argument contains the same elements, sometimes with a slightly different 
wording. For example, the different wording can concern the presence of negations in 
the inference license. After all, the inference statement in modus tollens is the 
contrapositive of the inference statement in modus ponens, which means that the 
variables change places (being antecedent or consequent) and are each other’s 
negation. Also the mood of verbs can be different (indicative or subjunctive), but this 
is not necessarily so. 
 Elsewhere (Jansen forthcoming 2007a) I’ve argued that the reductio ad 
absurdum is an argument form. That is to say: it is an argument type that is 
characterised by its form instead of its pragmatic content. When an argument type is 
defined by its pragmatic content, it is defined by the nature of the inference license, 
or—in other words—by the nature of the argument scheme that is expressed in the 
argument. Since all types of pragmatic content that may define an argument scheme 
can occur in a reductio ad absurdum, the reductio ad absurdum cannot be defined by 
a specific kind of pragmatic content. Instead, the reductio ad absurdum must be 
characterised as a form, a conclusion that is reinforced by the fact that arguments in 
reductio ad absurdum form can be restated into another form. I have shown this in the 
introduction with regard to the analogical reductio ad absurdum argument about the 
death penalty for Saddam Hussein, where a comparison is made between the death 
penalty imposed on Saddam Hussein and those imposed on World War II criminals. A 
reconstruction of the reductio ad absurdum argument looks as follows: 
 
1. There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore 
not even in the case of Saddam Hussein, for  
1.1 If you reject the death penalty on principle in all cases, you also have to 
do that with retrospective force in respect of the death sentences 
pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the 
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, and 
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1.1’ No one would do that (i.e. ‘that would be absurd’) 
 
This argument can be restated into the form with explicit data: 
 
1. There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore 
not even in the case of Saddam Hussein, for  
1.1 You also do not do that with retrospective force in respect of the death 
sentences pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the 
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, and 
1.1’ If you do not reject the one thing, you should not reject the other thing.  
 
However, in the case of analogical argumentation the form with an explicit inference 
license in modus ponens form is less likely:2
 
1. There is no case where we should reject the death penalty and therefore 
not even in the case of Saddam Hussein, for 
1.1 If you also do not do that with retrospective force in respect of the death 
sentences pronounced and carried out after the Second World War in the 
Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe, you also should not reject the 
death penalty in the case of Saddam Hussein3, and  
1.1’ No one wants to reject the death penalty with retrospective force in 
respect of the death sentences pronounced and carried out after the 
Second World War in the Netherlands and elsewhere in Europe.  
 
The form of reductio ad absurdum argumentation is very similar to modus tollens 
(Jansen forthcoming 2007a). The difference between a ‘simple’ modus tollens and a 
reductio ad absurdum may be the stepwise presentation in the reductio ad absurdum 
and the explicit presentation of the antecedent as a hypothetical situation with 
‘suppose that….’ (although in many examples such an explicit introduction of the 
hypothetical antecedent is absent).4 Some of the examples mentioned in the literature 
                                                 
2 In Jansen (2006) I argued that this form is less likely to be used, because it puts the important element 
of the comparison in an unfocused position (the antecedent). However, my opinion now is that the 
peculiarity of analogical argumentation expressed in this argument form is caused by the ‘newness’ of 
the information presented in the antecedent. The antecedent of a conditional premise has to contain 
information that has been referred to earlier, or must be accessible by experience (‘given’ information; 
see for this terminology Östman & Virtanen 1999). An analogical case most often conveys new 
information and therefore this argument form seems less appropriate for expressing the analogical 
argument scheme (note that in the case of Suzanne not being at home, both the speaker and the hearer 
can be standing in front of Suzanne’s house watching an empty parking space). For that matter, the 
observation that principles of information structuring influence the choice for a specific argument form 
downplays the role of rhetorical motives.  
3 This inference license can also be presented the other way around, namely by starting with the 
consequent: ‘you should not reject the death penalty in the case of Saddam Hussein if you do not also 
reject…’. This makes me aware that there is more to argument form than I have discussed here.  
4 With regard to the stepwise presentation reductio ad absurdum-argumentation is similar to what 
Walton calls Slippery Slope-argumentation, that is to say: to those types of Slippery Slope 
argumentation that do not make an appeal to causal consequences, but to logical consequences (the 
sorites/linguistic and precedent types) (Walton, 1992, p. 74; 1996, p. 203). Walton himself points out a 
connection between these types and the reductio ad absurdum, but according to him these types of 
Slippery Slope are ‘not the same as the familiar type of reductio, where a proposition is reduced to 
absurdity by deducing a contradiction from it’ (1992, p. 259); apparently because he holds the 
mathematical view on reductio ad absurdum (see for a discussion of this view: Jansen forthcoming 
2007a).   
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as reductio ad absurdum-arguments and that can be classified as counterexamples (a 
subclass of symptomatic argumentation) contain such an argument structure: the 
argument goes from the one consequence to the other before ending in the ultimate 
absurd consequence. For example: the standpoint that a sign saying no animals are 
allowed in a store cannot be taken literally is defended by an appeal to the implication 
that this would mean blind people could not enter the store, and consequently by the 
further implication that the person may thus starve (which makes the argument 
absurd) (Jensen 1981, p. 271). Also causal reductio ad absurdum arguments can 
contain this more complex structure: ‘Humans and other meat-eaters are innately 
friendly, for if they were not innately friendly, they would have eaten their offspring 
and would have died out long ago’. Such more complex forms of the reductio ad 
absurdum suit Hoaglund’s description of the reductio ad absurdum as ‘an extended 
version of the modus tollens’ (2004, p. 421). However, a more complex form is not 
necessary for classifying a certain piece of argumentation as reductio ad absurdum 
argumentation. 
 
3. WHAT MAKES AN ANALOGICAL REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM 
PERSUASIVE 
 
The fact that arguments can be presented in different forms legitimises the question 
why an arguer would choose one form above the other. It also suggests that the choice 
of one form or the other may be regarded as an instance of strategic manoeuvring with 
the presentation (see van Eemeren & Houtlosser 2002). The choice of a particular 
argument form is largely determined by the correlation between its formal 
characteristics, as for example the explicitness or implicitness of the inference license, 
and the argument scheme that is expressed in the argument. For example, in Jansen 
(forthcoming 2007b) I argue that with regard to arguments based on a counterexample 
(the subtype of symptomatic argumentation), the formal characteristics of the form of 
a reductio ad absurdum make it more effective than other forms and that the form 
with explicit data is least persuasive. In contrast, with respect to analogical reductio 
ad absurdum I have defended the hypothesis that the reductio ad absurdum form and 
the form with explicit data are probably equally persuasive (Jansen 2006).5 Below I 
will present new, additional considerations with regard to these conclusions.  
 
3.1 Characteristics of an analogical reductio and the effect of ridicule 
  
Studying the literature and examples on reductio ad absurdum argumentation in 
which an appeal to an analogy is made, it can be concluded that this type of argument 
may contain a normative or a descriptive standpoint. The way in which the 
consequences are perceived as absurd depends on the type of standpoint. When the 
standpoint is normative, the absurd consequences consist in a contradiction with 
opinions that are generally agreed upon. The example about Saddam Hussein’s death 
penalty is an instantiation of such reductio ad absurdum argumentation. When the 
standpoint is descriptive, the absurdity consists in a contradiction with well-known 
facts. An example of this latter type is that it is not true that a corporation cannot 
make an oral contract because it has no tongue, because, if it were true, a corporation 
                                                 
5 My main argument was that the reductio ad absurdum form seems to imply an appeal to common 
ground and that a suggestion of such an appeal can also be reached in the normal form with explicit 
data when these data are accompanied with indicators like ‘after all’ or when they are presented in the 
form of a rhetorical question.  
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could also not make a written contract because it has no hand (McBurney & Mills 
1964, p. 288). Nevertheless, the standpoint remains implicit most of the time. In the 
examples found in the literature the attack starts immediately with repeating the 
attacked standpoint in the antecedent of the conditional premise and then the showing 
its absurd consequence in the consequent. It must be reconstructed as a negative 
standpoint towards a proposition that consists of the attacked viewpoint. This 
proposition can be formulated either in a positive or in a negative way, depending on 
the formulation of the viewpoint attacked. It has the following form: ‘(not-)X is 
[negative qualification]’. The negative qualification can for example be: ‘not true’ or 
‘ridiculous’ or ‘absurd’. 
 Characteristic of the examples that have been described in the literature as 
reductio ad absurdum argumentation is that they are all instantiations of a subclass of 
analogical argumentation, namely ‘refutation by logical analogy’.6 This kind of 
analogical argumentation is used in order to refute the opponent’s reasoning structure, 
or, in other words, the justificatory power of the premise that the opponent has put 
forward in order to defend that standpoint. Its justificatory power is attacked by 
comparing it with a similar but absurd way of reasoning. Take for example the 
argument about the oral contract: the reductio ad absurdum primarily focuses on the 
insufficiency of the premise of corporations not having a tongue as a justification for 
the standpoint that corporations cannot make oral contracts. In another example the 
reasoning that football should be abolished because it results in death and injury is 
compared with the reasoning that bathtubs should be abolished for the same reason 
(Jensen 1981, p. 271). Or the standpoint that third world countries should not get self-
determination because they lack experience in democratic government is compared 
with not going near water without successful experience in swimming (Freeley 1981, 
p. 230). Either the structure ‘A because B’ is attacked with the absurd structure ‘C 
because B’ or ‘A because B’ is attacked by the absurd structure ‘C because D’. That a 
way of reasoning is being attacked, is indicated by the formulations that are used: 
‘then, according to your own argument…’ (McBurney & Mills 1964, p. 288), ‘if this 
line of reasoning is valid…’ (Thompson 1971, p. 223) and ‘this reasoning should be 
logically extended to…’ (Hollihan & Baaske 1973, p. 153). Also Dutch examples of 
refutational analogy in reductio ad absurdum-form that I have found in newspapers 
contain such like indicators: ‘ideeën wat nader uitwerken…’ [ideas which if 
developed], ‘als je deze redenering door zou trekken…’ [and if you follow this line of 
argument to its logical conclusion] en ‘bij consequent voortgezette redenering’ [from 
this line of thought it logically follows].  
According to Jensen (1981, p. 189) a reductio ad absurdum obtains its alleged 
humorous and ironical effect because such an argument pushes the viewpoint under 
attack to the extreme: the comparison is so dissimilar that it creates exaggeration and 
humour. Also Whaley and Holloway (1996, p. 165) see it this way: ‘The more 
exaggerated the base [i.e. the analogical way of reasoning with which the attacked 
way of reasoning is compared], the more ridicule the analogy creates’. These remarks 
suggest that the case being used for comparison is humorous in itself, because it is too 
absurd to contemplate. However, analyses of Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969) 
and Tindale & Gough (1987) suggest that there is more to it than this. Combining 
their ways of looking at the irony of an appeal to consequences gives the following 
picture. First, humour is created when the case being used for comparison blatantly 
contradicts generally shared norms. In other words: the compared case is extreme in 
                                                 
6 See Govier (2001). The type of argument she refers to is called ‘rebuttal analogy’ by Whaley & 
Holloway (1996) and Whaley (1998).  
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the sense that it transcends ‘the basic agreement we have about the limits of 
reasonableness’ (Tindale & Gough 1987, p. 11). As a result, the one who holds the 
attacked viewpoint is accused of inconsistent commitments (Perelman & Olbrechts-
Tyteca 1969, p. 206). Namely, on the one hand this person holds the viewpoint under 
attack, whereas on the other hand, by so doing, he is committed to another viewpoint 
that no rational person wishes to hold. Since it must be assumed that the person under 
attack considers himself a rational being, it is suggested that he actually does not want 
to hold the implied viewpoint and will withdraw the original viewpoint. However, for 
the time being he is accused of holding two incompatible viewpoints and, according 
to Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca (ibid.), this makes him look ridiculous.7  
 
Considering the hilarious examples of the analogical reductio ad absurdum presented 
in the literature, it seems that the effect of absurdity can only be achieved when the 
line of reasoning held up for comparison blatantly contradicts norms that are shared 
by everyone. However, in my opinion the examples in the textbooks have this feature 
because they must make sense to any reader in order to illustrate the concept of 
absurdity. In contrast, an actual arguer does not have to deal with ‘any’ reader or ‘any’ 
listener. He only has to address the norms of his audience. For an arguer it is enough 
if the viewpoint with which the attacked viewpoint is compared is absurd in the eyes 
of his audience. So, an arguer has to refer to common ground between him and his 
audience. Consider the following examples: 
 
Example 1 
‘It is ridiculous that cannabis is banned because of its stupefying effects, for 
then alcohol should also be prohibited for being a drug.’ 
 
Example 2 
‘It is ridiculous that we do not force the tobacco industry to pay for the 
illnesses of smokers, for then ‘the polluter pays’ principle should also not 
apply in the environmental sector.’8
 
In these examples a certain reasoning structure is attacked by comparing it with 
another reasoning structure, which, it is suggested, is obviously unacceptable. 
However, the viewpoint to be compared may only be absurd for a particular audience, 
for example an audience of vintners and a left wing audience respectively. For others 
there may be no appeal to common ground at all. An audience who have experience 
of alcoholicism may very well favour a ban on alcohol and it is well-known that there 
are those who think that the polluter pays principle goes too far. Because these 
analogies do not appeal to common ground in the sense that any rational being would 
find the compared viewpoint absurd, they do not have the same strikingly hilarious 
effect of the examples in the literature. But if the arguer has correctly assessed the 
norms of his audience, he can actually reach the same effect if the compared 
viewpoint contradicts those norms. So, although we cannot regard examples 1 and 2 
                                                 
7 An analogical reductio ad absurdum is thus a very personal attack. Such an attack may be persuasive, 
at least with respect to a third party, but there is also the danger it may alienate people (Jensen 1981, p. 
189). Also Whaley & Holloway (1996, p. 166) and Whaley (1998, p. 355, p. 360) signal the risk of 
being considered impolite when refuting someone’s standpoint by way of a rebuttal analogy. However, 
whether and how this would influence the argument’s persuasiveness is subject of their further 
research. 
8 Example based on van Eemeren, Houtlosser & Snoeck Henkemans (2005, p. 182).  
 7
HENRIKE JANSEN 
as yielding a commonly agreed upon absurd consequence, they are also instances of 
reductio ad absurdum argumentation. After all, it is implied in these kinds of 
arguments that the viewpoint presented for comparison must be regarded as absurd. 
The argument, as it were, presupposes common ground about this.9
 
3.2 The effect of argument form 
 
Having established that the reductio ad absurdum’s absurdity is derived from an 
appeal to common ground, I will now address the question whether these effects are 
better reached by the typical argument form of a reductio ad absurdum than the 
argument form with explicit data. As I have argued elsewhere, I think this is not the 
case. This time, I draw my evidence from the features that create the reductio ad 
absurdum’s ridiculous effect. Only when these features are present is there a chance 
that the audience will forget to consider whether the comparison is valid and thus 
whether the compared absurd viewpoint is indeed implied by the viewpoint under 
attack. In my opinion, this observation implies that if the condition of actual absurdity 
is indeed fulfilled, then it is less important to present the compared analogical case as 
a consequence. This opinion is supported by highly ironic examples of absurd 
analogies that are not presented in the typical reductio ad absurdum-form. For a start, 
many examples can be found in Whaley & Holloway (1996) and Whaley (1998). 
These examples begin by mentioning the attacked viewpoint, followed by 
formulations like ‘that’s like …’ and ‘isn’t that like…. ?’ and then followed by the 
alleged analogical viewpoint. Also the following examples, taken from a letter to the 
Dutch newspaper the NRC-Handelsblad, show examples of analogical reductio ad 
absurdum argumentation not presented in the typical reductio ad absurdum form: 
 
Example 3 
An attack on the standpoint that judges cannot wear veils for they must give an 
impression of impartiality: ‘Should a black judge also use powder to make 
himself white?’ (September 4, 2001) 
 
Example 4 
An attack on the standpoint that Islamic legislation may be introduced when 
this is the democratic decision of the majority: ‘Does the minister believe that 
in a democracy a majority can also re-introduce slavery?’ (September 4, 2006) 
 
 Example 5 
‘Abolishing happy hours because fourteen- and fifteen-year-olds use them is 
too ridiculous for words. You wouldn’t close down the motorway because it’s 
possible to break the speed limit, would you? (March 26, 2007) 
 
Despite their forms, we may very well regard these examples as instances of reductio 
ad absurdum: (1) they are refutations of an opponent’s way of reasoning, (2) although 
the standpoint in example 4 remains implicit, the one in example 5 is typical for an 
analogical reductio ad absurdum, and—most importantly—(3) the alleged analogical 
viewpoint expresses a blatant inconsistency with common ground. Actually, in 
addition to these examples it must be noted that the formulation of some examples of 
reductio ad absurdum in the literature also suggests that those authors are less 
                                                 
9 Therefore the argument is still a reductio ad absurdum when an arguer has miscalculated the norms of 
his audience. 
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concerned with making the appeal to consequences explicit. Jensen (1981, p. 271) 
uses the formulation ‘such a contention is like saying…’ and Tindale & Gough (1987, 
p. 13) present an example of an analogical reductio ad absurdum in which the 
comparison is directly made by means of a rhetorical question. 
Presumably, qualifying something as an analogical implication or 
consequence—as happens in the typical argument form of reductio ad absurdum—
does not convey extra information with regard to qualifying something as an 
analogical relationship. In both situations the analogical argumentation focuses on the 
arguer under attack being committed to similar viewpoints. This commitment can be 
invoked by ‘then also’, but equally by ‘also’ alone. I think that an analogical 
viewpoint is the same as an implied analogical viewpoint, for being committed to an 
analogical viewpoint already means that the analogical viewpoint is implied by the 
viewpoint to which it is analogous. Therefore, I assume that with regard to analogical 
argumentation an express appeal to implied consequences has less literal meaning 
than with regard to other types of argumentation (symptomatic and causal 
argumentation). Its main objective is the appeal to common ground and this objective 
can both be reached in the argument form of reductio ad absurdum as in the form 




In this paper I have presented a piece of my research on argument form and rhetorical 
effect. It cannot be said in general whether a specific argument form is effective: this 
question is—among others—related to the question of the argument scheme that is 
used in the argumentation. In this paper I focused on analogical argumentation 
presented in the form of a reductio ad absurdum. In the literature this kind of 
argument is thought to be a very effective way of attacking a viewpoint due to the 
humour and ridicule which it conveys. My research question was whether its alleged 
effect can also be related to its specific argument form—being the form with an 
explicit inference license formulated as in modus tollens. I have argued that this is not 
the case. An analogical relationship may be viewed as an implication anyway, no 
matter whether the implication is explicitly formulated as such.  
What makes an analogical reductio ad absurdum persuasive is caused by other 
factors than the argument form in which the argument is expressed. The most 
important factor is that the compared viewpoint that is presented as absurd is indeed 
absurd: the argument’s implied appeal to common ground must succeed. However, 
common ground does not have to be understood as contradictory to opinions that are 
generally accepted by any rational being, as is suggested by the way reductio ad 
absurdum argumentation is presented in the literature, in particular by the humorous 
examples presented there. Of course, contradiction with generally accepted norms 
creates the comic effect. Nevertheless, for an arguer who addresses a specific 
audience it may suffice to appeal to their specific norms, which may actually create a 
humorous effect for that specific audience as well. Such an effect may be achieved 
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